University of New Hampshire

University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository
Master's Theses and Capstones

Student Scholarship

Winter 2006

Power and punishment in Nietzsche
Jacob Skinner
University of New Hampshire, Durham

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/thesis

Recommended Citation
Skinner, Jacob, "Power and punishment in Nietzsche" (2006). Master's Theses and Capstones. 35.
https://scholars.unh.edu/thesis/35

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Scholarship at University of New Hampshire
Scholars' Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses and Capstones by an authorized
administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more information, please contact
Scholarly.Communication@unh.edu.

POWER AND PUNISHMENT IN NIETZSCHE
BY

JACOB SKINNER
BA, PHILOSOPHY & POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, 2004

THESIS

Submitted to the University o f New Hampshire
in Partial Fulfillment of
die Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts
In
Justice Studies

December 2006

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

UMI Number: 1439291

INFORMATION TO USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy
submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and
photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper
alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized
copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

®

UMI
UMI Microform 1439291
Copyright 2007 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company.
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

ProQuest Information and Learning Company
300 North Zeeb Road
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

This thesis has been examined and approved.

Thesis Director, Nicholas Smith, Assistant
Processor of Philosophy

Andrew Christie, Associate Professor of
Philosophy

Robert Scharff, Professor of Philosophy

w 'v a X

Date

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I thank Professor Nick Smith for heading my thesis committee as well
as Professor Robert Scharff and Professor Drew Christie for their
contributions as readers.

m

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.................................................................................. iii
ABSTRACT........................................................................................................ v

CHAPTER

PAGE

I.

INTRODUCTION..................................................................................... 1

II.

POWER & VALUE.................................................................................. 8

III.

THE CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF PUNISHMENT...........................11

IV.

NOBLE AND CORRUPT PRACTICES OF PUNISHMENT.................19

V.

FROM A POSSIBLE FUTURE.............................................................44

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY..........................................................................55
REFERENCE NOTES..................................................................................... 66

iv

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ABSTRACT
POWER AND PUNISHMENT IN NIETZSCHE
by
Jacob Skinner
University of New Hampshire, May, 2006

Nietzsche appears to hold contradictory views about punishment.
Uncompromising in his commitment to noble ideals, Nietzsche often decries
punishment as small-minded resentfulness and implores readers to look
away. Though at times he describes it as an exalted flexing of the will,
making the case that punishment plays a necessary role in social life. This
paper argues that Nietzsche’s views are not incompatible and that he holds a
coherent theory of punishment which permits these clashing positions.
I argue that Nietzsche’s theory of punishment is predicated as follows.
Power is the objective measure of value. The single justification for punishing
is the empowerment of power. By breaking down the concept of punishment
into two basic elements, Nietzsche shows that the essential function of
punishment is the exercise of power and control over others, while the
equivocal element is the particular end which a given exercise of punishment
aims to empower. When the end is deemed noble, punishment empowers
power and is thus justified as valuable. When the end is deemed corrupt,
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punishment effectually empowers weakness, or disempowers power, and
thus evaluated as unjustifiable.
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CHAPTER I

NIETZSCHE & THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT

Introduction
Theories of punishment are generally considered of two types: the
deterrence theory of punishment and the retributive theory of punishment. More
precisely, deterrence and retribution describe the functions of modem penal
practices: the moral justifications for punishing are grounded in consequentialism
and deontology.1

Those remotely familiar with Nietzsche know he is an

outspoken critic of both consequentialism (utilitarianism) and deontology, and
thus it should come with little surprise that throughout his writing modem penal
practices are attacked for being complicit with corrupt, life denying ideals.

In

place of this criticism, however, Nietzsche neither offers an explicit theory of his
own nor commits to an alternative theory of punishment. What, then, is his
ultimate position on the practice of punishment? Is he denying its justification as
a social institution outright?

Does he implicitly align with some alternative

theory? Is his work on the topic incomplete? Although fairly limited in number,
there exist several different scholarly interpretations of Nietzsche’s position.2 I
believe what is offered to be incorrect. The purpose of this paper is to add to the
discussion by putting forth a competing interpretation of Nietzsche’s theory of
punishment.

1
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Nietzsche’s opposition to punishment is often quite overwhelming.

At

times he likens the practice to a nauseating denial of life which ought to be
banished. “...Let us eliminate the concept of sin from the world,” he cries, “and
let us soon dispatch the concept of punishment after it!

May these exiled

monster live somewhere else henceforth and not among men—if they insist on
living and will not perish of disgust with themselves!”3 Elsewhere Nietzsche
depicts punishment as a more offensive sight than the crime itself: “A strange
thing, our punishment. It does not cleanse the criminal, it is no atonement; on
the contrary, it pollutes worse than the crime does.”4 He explicitly accuses the
practice of punishment as disguising expressions of cowardly violence,
ressentiment, and revenge.

It sanctifies ugly emotions and excuses

reprehensible behaviors by feigning “a good conscience for itself with a lie."5
Through his mouthpiece, Zarathustra, Nietzsche thus councils us to “Mistrust all
in whom the impulse to punish is powerful,”6 for more often than not those who
call themselves just and advocate punishment conceal pleasure in the sight of
suffering and desire to wield power over others. Drawing from these numerous
diatribes, many have interpreted Nietzsche’s theory of punishment as primarily
critical in orientation. Michael Moore and Robert Solomon, for example, argue
that Nietzsche’s uncompromising commitment to the ideals of nobility translates
into a wholesale rejection of punishment.7 Punishing others is never a virtuous
action. “Let us not become darker ourselves on their [criminals’] account, like all
those who punish others and feel dissatisfied,” writes Nietzsche. “Let us sooner
step aside. Let us look away.”8

2
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While an abundance of evidence supporting this interpretation is found in
Nietzsche’s writing, drawing the conclusion that Nietzsche is an unequivocal
opponent of punishment is difficult to accept for two reasons. First, complete
opposition to punishment conjures an image of society that would appear more
anarchist in constitution than noble, and Nietzsche makes no secret of his belief
that social order is necessary and anarchy corrupt.9 After all, without punishment
how could the noble impose their will over competing wills? Second, the sheer
strength of Nietzsche’s opposition to punishment seems to overshadow the
supportive remarks for punishment which are also found in his writing.
Nietzsche, for instance, describes certain individuals as biological members of
"the race of criminals" and implores society "to wage war against him even
before he has committed any hostile act [first act as soon as one has him in one's
power: his castration]."10 Elsewhere claims that “If punishment and reward were
abolished the strongest motives for performing certain acts and not performing
certain acts would be abolished; mankind’s utility requires their continuance.”11
In fact, throughout the second essay in “On the Genealogy of Morals” entitled
“‘Guilt,’ ‘Bad Conscience,’ and the Like,” Nietzsche engages in his most
sustained discussion of punishment, presenting a balanced and comprehensive
analysis which treats punishment as necessary but also potentially inimical to
human flourishing.12 His criticism, of course, targets the latter. Two alternative
interpretations of Nietzsche’s theory of punishment have emerged.
The first, put forth by Aaron Small, argues that Nietzsche’s competing
views on punishment are evidence that Nietzsche holds no coherent theory of

3
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punishment at all.13 The reasons we punish have, according to Nietzsche,
become thoroughly entangled, blurring what might be considered justifiable
motives for punishing with the unjustifiable, or at least rendering them
incompatible with reality: “Today it is impossoble to say for certain why people
are punished: all concepts in which an entire process is semiotically concentrated
elude definition; only that which has no history is definable.” According to Small,
Nietzsche’s recognition that punishment is “overdetermined by utilities of all
kinds”14 is his great insight into the philosophy of punishment. Small concludes
that “any attempt to assign a single meaning to the concept of punishment is
misguided,”15 because Nietzsche’s insight indicts the coherency of all theories of
punishment.

I disagree with Small’s conclusion because in interpreting

Nietzsche’s theory of punishment I don’t assign importance to punishment’s
specific utility as Small does.

I believe that Nietzsche has something more

fundamental in mind when he evaluates the practice of punishment, and will
discuss this objection in conjunction with my positive conception of Nietzsche’s
theory of punishment in detail toward the beginning of chapter four.
The second alternative argues that while Nietzsche is often a powerful
opponent of punishment, his opposition is qualified by a positive theory of
punishment. A consequentialist, for instance, should loudly object to punishment
in a world which only practices cruel punishment, for it thus creates
disproportionate amounts of pain and negates the moral justification to punish.
That is, her objections don’t imply a universal rejection of punishment, for here
criticism actually affirms her underlying commitment to the consequentialist

4
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theory of punishment, which values the maximizing of some overall good. Kyron
Huigens takes a similar position, arguing that what Nietzsche opposes is not
punishment altogether, but the modem institution of punishment as predicated
upon the moral theories of consequentialism and deontology.16 Both, Huigen
argues, are products of what Nietzsche considers slave morality. As opposed to
the values master morality espouses in its affirmation of life, the values of slave
morality originate out of hatred for and exhaustion with life. They are nihilistic,
ascetic, overly rational, and have the affect of suffocating instead of stimulating
human flourishing. Their reflection in penal practices, Huigens believes, creates
a distorted picture of criminal fault and an “austere conception of truth” based on
unrealistic accounts of human agency and happiness.17 Thus, Huigens believes
that Nietzsche’s overall criticism is intended to criticize penal practices for
hindering rather than promoting human flourishing. In contrast, Huigen argues
that virtue ethics—currently unrepresented in modem legal theory—stress the
notion of human flourishing in ways close to Nietzsche’s notion of master
morality. Despite his wrathful opposition to punishment as currently practiced,
Huigen believes that Nietzsche would endorse an aretaic legal theory as a
relatively unproblematic version of master morality. The aretaic legal theory is
“premised on virtue ethics,” which, according to Huigens, offers “an alternative to
both the deontological theory and the consequentialist theory of punishment.”18
By altering underlying ethical assumptions, social institutions shaped in the
image of slave morality could be supplanted by those shaped in the image of
master morality.

In turn, the positive component of Nietzsche’s theory of

5
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punishment would justify punishment for playing a role in “the process of
habituation to virtue” by instantiating the rules, displaying the rules publicly,
providing “an incentive to abide by the rules until they are internalized,” and
securing the “peace against those who cannot acquire virtue in order to enable
those who can to do so.”19 Punishment, in other words, is justified as an
instrument for the development of virtue.
I agree with Huigens’ position that Nietzsche’s critical orientation ought to
be interpreted as an extension of positive commitments. As I later argue, there is
overwhelming evidence to conclude that while Nietzsche certainly despised
modern penal practices, he did so with an alternative theory of punishment in
mind.

However, my thesis is that this alternative is not in the habituation to

virtue, but in the empowering of power. Huigens’ argument fails to capture the
breadth of Nietzsche’s theory of punishment which extols power, not virtue, as
the ultimate justification for punishing. Life is affirmed through active reaching for
power; punishment is justified when it serves this end alone.

Thesis
Focusing on the relationship between power and punishment is essential
to understanding Nietzsche’s theory of punishment because power informs both
his conceptual definition of punishment as well as the criterion for determining its
justification. I argue that Nietzsche’s theory of punishment identifies the essential
function of punishment to be an exercise of control, an expression of power, and
that he grounds the question of justification in an analysis of what end is thereby
empowered. When wielded for noble ends, power is empowered, thus justifying

6
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the practice of punishment as having value. When wielded for corrupt ends,
weakness is empowered and thus punishment becomes inimical to power and
has disvalue.
I develop this thesis in 4 stages. In chapter II I establish power as the
source of value and establish Nietzsche’s distinction between noble and corrupt.
Chapter III analyzes Nietzsche’s conception of punishment and establishes its
essential function as control and power. In chapter IV I perform an exegesis of
the second essay in Genealogy entitled “‘Guilt,’ ‘Bad Conscience,’ and the Like,”
making a case for my claim that Nietzsche evaluates punishment as a practice
wielded by both the noble (justifiable) and corrupt (unjustifiable).

Chapter V

concludes with my heuristic outline of Nietzsche’s theory of punishment as he
envisions it supplanting modem penal practices in some possible future state of
affairs.

7
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CHAPTER It

POWER & VALUE

Like

consequentialist

and

deontological

theories

of

punishment,

Nietzsche’s theory of punishment hinges on a conception of value.

For

deontologists,

For

punishment

is

justified

as

a

moral

obligation.

consequentialists, punishment’s justification lies in the capacity to promote some
overall measure of social welfare. For Nietzsche, value is understood in terms of
Power generation, and thus the value of punishment hinges on the promotion of
Power.
With the death of metaphysics as a source of truth, Nietzsche draws the
conclusion that all value “has long been created.”20

Power is its objective

determination, a claim Nietzsche defends through an investigation into value’s
origins where the value of value(s) is determined. According to Nietzsche, the
basic values of “good” and “bad” originated through the “good” themselves, "that
is to say, the noble, powerful, high-stationed” who established “good” out of their
own image and “bad” out of the contrasting image of the common people 21
Nietzsche sees this idea captured in the Greek term esthlos, the ancient name
bestowed upon someone to signify “one who is, who possesses reality, who is
actual, who is true.”22 Power is understood in terms of human flourishing and

8
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overcoming, and this is the universal measure of value: “What is the objective
measure of value? Solely the quantum of enhanced and organized power.”23
The value contrast between “good” and “bad” is thus grounded in relation to
power’s capacity to expand:
What is good? Everything that heightens the feeling of power in
man, the will to power, power itself. What is bad? Everything that
is born of weakness. What is happiness? The feeling that power is
growing, that resistance is overcome. Not contentedness but more
power; not peace but war; not virtue but fitness. The weak and
failures shall perish: fist principle of our love of man. And they shall
be given every possible assistance.24
In a universe without metaphysical truth, why does Nietzsche feel entitled
to claim that power has any real priority? From an empirical standpoint Nietzsche
believes that striving for power constitutes the essence of the core of all being:
“out of the esteeming itself speaks the will to power.”25 All beings want power,
even as they deny and sacrifice themselves. “In all events a will to power is
operating,” which strives to create “greater units of power” by overcoming
restrictions and becoming master.26 Will to power is so basic that even the
definition of power is contained in this idea; power is conceived through the
manifestation of will to power as power over some previous level of power
followed by the renewed yearning to overcome this level of power and
continuously transcend limitations.

Life is “that which must always overcome

itself.127 Power is enjoyed only in the experience of more power: “there is no law;
every power draws its last consequence at every moment.”28 Power is thus
actively created, and in this respect the process through which the values “good”
and “bad” implies their continuous recreation: “Driven on by themselves, they
must overcome themselves again and again.”29
9
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Nietzsche considers the ultimate value in terms of attaining human
greatness, or self-overcoming. Man, according to Nietzsche, is a bridge between
ape and overman.

By overcoming the animal in ourselves we, in essence,

transform ourselves into super-humans, and it is this transformation that
eradicates nihilistic withdrawal and justifies the universe.30 The value of human
association, therefore, is neither moral nor utilitarian in measure, but rather a
question of "what type of man shall be bred, shall be willed, for being higher in
value, worthier of life, more certain of a future.”31
Nietzsche envisions the overman as the embodiment of self-perfection
characterized by both physical and psychological mastery over oneself and over
one’s circumstances.

In Dionysian harmony, the lion’s physical prowess

combines with the saint’s inner strength of control sublimating our most violent
animal passions into the most elevated forms of greatness and beauty: The
“Strength of a Roman Caesar and the soul of Christ.”32 This is Power, and to this
end alone Nietzsche sees the practice of punishment justified. It is also to this
end, or rather as opposed to this end, that Nietzsche sees the practice of
punishment as most objectionable.

10
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CHAPTER III

THE CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF PUNISHMENT

In this section I explain how Nietzsche conceptualizes punishment in
terms of form and meaning, that the form is enduring while the meaning changes,
that the form of punishment existed prior to punishment itself and was sublimated
when a meaning was associated with it giving it some specific purpose, and that
for these reasons the form of punishment reveals what is essential about the
practice—control and power over others for now this and now that purpose. I
also briefly discuss these numerous associated ends as they are the focus of
next section and the question mark in determining punishment’s value.

The Concept of Punishment
Nietzsche intends for this generalization to apply not only to the political
practice of punishment, but to the concept of punishment in general. A parent
punishes a child to gain control over their behavior.

Gang members punish

disloyalty to establish code while military officials punish insubordination to
uphold strict rank and file procedures. Teachers punish students to instill fear
and reinforce their control over the classroom. The weak punish in order to revel
in the feeling of power over others. Even self-punishment is an expression of

11
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compulsion reverberating through an internally divided individual. Consider, for
example, Tiger Woods, who, sickened after missing his first cut in a Major
Tournament, locked himself up in a room to endure the most painful thing
imaginable: watching the remainder on television.

Needless to say, Woods

emerged from this torture chamber to win his next six tournaments, just as
punishment in general serves to empower some particular end.
In order to define something knowledge of its essence is essential.
Nietzsche deconstructs the concept of punishment into what he believes are two
basic elements: an enduring element which we’ll refer to as the form of
punishment (the formal acts and procedures) and the fluid element which we’ll
refer to as the meaning behind punishment (the purposes and expectations
associated with the form). The form is “a certain strict sequence of procedures”
which involves inflicting pain, removing freedom, and causing harm.33 Nietzsche
considers the form the enduring aspect in punishment because the practice has,
throughout history, consistently involved the infliction of suffering. The meaning,
however, is considered the fluid aspect because the purpose and “expectation
associated with the performance of such procedures” has consistently undergone
changes throughout history.34 Together, these two elements satisfy our concept
of punishment.
If we consider each in isolation, the form and meaning no longer seem
distinctively penal.

For instance, injury, pain, harm, loss, (i.e. the form of

punishment) can be inflicted upon a person in many different situations which
aren’t considered punishment. I could fall into a well and be confined to nasty

12
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conditions similar to the ones prisoners face, but this wouldn’t be considered
punishment since the form is inflicted accidentally (i.e. absent an agent’s
intentions). I could, however, punish myself by locking myself up and inflicting
pain if I felt I had broke my own law and needed to be punished. Or consider, for
example, a person in the woods who is trampled by a pack of wild horses and
must suffer an excruciatingly painful death.

Now consider Nietzsche’s

description of the same event, only this time as a form of punishment: “Consider
the old German punishments; for example...tearing apart or trampling by
horses.”35 We certainly wouldn’t call the former an act of punishment, although
we do the latter when it’s performed in the middle of a town on a recently
captured murderer. In both examples the associated expectation is purposive,
and this purposiveness satisfies our conception of punishment: we recognize the
associated meaning as a necessary part of the definition of punishment.
The meaning associated with forms of punishment (be it deterrence,
revenge, sadism etc.) is unthinkable if the form is removed. In the absence of
some formal procedure it’s impossible to imagine the association of meaning.
After all, how can there be an association, or even an expectation, without a
predication? It’s perfectly reasonable for me to expect that student lateness, for
example, would decrease if I held students 10 minutes after class for every 1
minute they came in late. But what would I base these expectations on if some
kind of underlying action was lacking? Suppose I expressed to my students that
lateness upsets me personally, but didn’t enforce any kind of material penalty. I
could still ground expectations that lateness will decrease in the fact that I had a

13
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conversation with my students in which I conveyed the message that being late
will cause me to be upset and therefore believe, or at least certainly hope, being
late would hurt them because they would be upset to upset me.

Formal

procedures can be thought of without meaningful expectations; meaningful
expectations cannot be thought of in a vacuum.
Nietzsche’s draws the concept of punishment apart in order to better
understand the nature of its inner constitution. This inner constitution, I believe,
reveals both the essence of punishment as well the source determining whether
or not the practice itself has value.

The essential function of punishment is

captured through its form, and I discuss this in detail below. Punishment’s value,
the question of its justification, is determined by examining the meaning towards
which the practice is applied, and I discuss this in detail next section.

Form & Meaning
Nietzsche analyzes the meaning associated with punishment, its fluid
element, into numerous different purposes or utilities which have been “projected
and interpreted into the procedure” throughout history and which today, in a
culminating stew, “possess in fact not one meaning but a whole synthesis of
‘meanings.’”36 While it was once possible to pinpoint some single specific
meaning, due to the long history behind punishment and the growing tendency
for associations made in previous employments to overlap and carry into later
ones, any specific explanation of why today we punish is impossible to
determine: “Today it is impossible to say for certain why people are punished: all

14
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concepts in which an entire process is semioticaliy concentrated elude definition;
only that which has no history is definable.”37
To illustrate just how fluid the meaning has been, Nietzsche juxtaposes
several different purposes which have all been associated with the same
procedure.

Punishment is enacted for “rendering harmless” and “preventing

further harm,” while at other times it becomes a way to compensate “the injured
party for harm done.” Punishment might function to isolate the “disturbance of an
equilibrium” so that no further spread of disorder occurs. Punishment can be
used as a means of “inspiring fear” of the political authorities in the minds of the
public, or it might be employed because society wants to pay back criminals for
the advantages they experienced as a result of their criminal activity. At times
punishment is a cleansing of perceived cancerous elements from a society, while
other times it’s a social celebration and festival in the form of a “rape and
mockery of a finally defeated enemy.” Punishment is used to bum into people
memories, whether it’s “for him who suffers the punishment...or for those who
witness its execution.” Punishment is also enacted as a type of compromise with
the victim’s desire for personal revenge, and other times as the repayment that
society demands when it punished in order to “protect the wrongdoer form the
excesses of revenge." Punishment may be a society’s formal declaration of war
“against an enemy of peace, of the law, of order, of the authorities.”38
This is not, according to Nietzsche, a complete list, but rather serves to
illustrate just how many different purposes have been attached to punishment
and achieved with the same procedure.

It also draws our attention to a

15
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substantial number of purposes, none of which stretch the imagination,
competing in the modem punishment machine and potentially operative in any
decision to punish. But if punishment consists of two aspects, one being all
these different purposes and the second being the procedure they are projected
into, and if, as we discussed earlier, it’s not reasonable to speak of purposes
without first having a procedure of some sort in mind from which to base these
expectations, then the question must be asked: which is older, the procedure or
the purpose, form or meaning? Expectations, it would seem, must be derived
from observing the results of actions, and therefore associated meanings seem
posterior to empirical observations. Are the procedures which constitute the form
of punishment older than the meaningful practice itself? If so, does the projection
of meaning into form make the concept of punishment a sublimation of
something?

Is the essence of punishment a question of more than simply

punishment and some particular outcome like deterrence or retribution?
The answer is yes: Nietzsche locates the essence of punishment running
deeper than any socially contingent meaning.
Yet a word on the origin and the purpose of punishment—two
problems that are separate, or ought to be separate: unfortunately,
they are usually confounded. How have previous genealogists of
morals set about solving these problems? Naively, as has always
been their way: they seek out some ‘‘purpose’’ in punishment, for
example, revenge or deterrence, then guilelessly place this purpose
at the beginning as causa fiendi of punishment, and— have done.
The “purpose of law,” however, is absolutely the last thing to
employ in the history of the origin of law: on the contrary, there is
for historiography of any kind no more important proposition than
the one it took such effort to establish but which really ought to be
established now: the cause of the origin of a thing and its eventual
utility, its actual employment and place in a system of purposes, lie
world’s apart; whatever exists, having somehow come into being, is

16
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again and again reinterpreted to new ends, taken over,
transformed, and redirected by some power superior to it; all events
in the organic world are a subduing, a becoming master, and all
subduing and becoming master involves a fresh interpretation, an
adaptation through which any previous “meaning” and “purpose”
are necessarily obscured or even obliterated. However well one
has understood the utility of any physiological organ (or of a legal
institution, a social custom, a political usage, a form in art or in a
religious cult), this means nothing regarding its origin; however
uncomfortable and disagreeable this may sound to older ears—for
one had always believed that to understand the demonstrable
purpose, the utility of a thing, a form, or an institution, was also to
understand the reason why it originated—the eye being made for
seeing, the hand being made for grasping. Thus one also imagined
that punishment was devised for punishing.39
Nietzsche refutes the idea that punishment exists for the purpose of
punishing—therefore excluding associated meanings from its essential definition-and offers instead a thesis attributing meaning to the flux in which competing
wills to power exert their desire for Power by attempting to overpower previous
powers and direct them towards their use. What’s essential in punishment is its
sublimated form, and thus Nietzsche concludes the form must have been
“something older, earlier than its employment in punishment, that the latter
[meaning] is projected and interpreted into the procedure (which has long existed
but been employed in another sense).”40
We’re left with an important question then: in what capacity did the
procedure exist prior to being employed in punishment? Nietzsche claims the
form is sublimated (or, more precisely, aufheben)41 into the practice of
punishment when meaning is associated.

It is a “canceled” “preserved” and

“picked up” form of barbaric, painful, warlike violence and cruelty characteristic of
pre-socialized states of nature and instinctively recognized as a method of

17
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control and power over individuals. Among the earliest practices of punishment
the form originally replicated the return to what the social entity itself stood in
opposition to.
...the community, throws him back again into the savage and
outlaw
state
against
which
he
has
hitherto
been
protected...‘‘Punishment” at this level of civilization is simply a copy,
a mimus, of the normal attitude toward a hated, disarmed,
prostrated enemy, who has lost not only every right and protection,
but all hope of quarter as well; it is thus the rights of war and the
victory celebration of the vae victis! in all their mercilessness and
cruelty—which explains why it is that war itself (including the
warlike sacrificial cult) has provided all the forms punishment has
assumed throughout history.42
The essence of punishment is control and power. How this control and power is
used—the question of its justification—is the topic of the next chapter.

18
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CHAPTER IV

NOBLE AND CORRUPT PRACTICES OF PUNISHMENT

In this section I argue that Nietzsche determines the value of punishment
by examining the associated meaning and classifying it as either noble or
corrupt. When punishment is wielded by the noble, power increases and thus
justifies the practice.

As social power increases, the value associated with

punishing undergoes fluctuation: the stronger the society, the less it finds the
need to punish and the more nuanced its application of punishment.

When

punishment is wielded for corrupt ends, powers which are hostile to life increase,
thus transfiguring punishment into an instrument of nihilistic recoil.

Behind Meaning
Robin Small argues that by uncovering how the meaning associated with
punishment “is overdetermined by utilities of all kinds”43 Nietzsche’s intention is
to demonstrate that no single theory of punishment can provide adequate
justification for the practice: "the distinction between punishment as a material
practice and the further functions which it has or is believed to have implies that
there is no single explanation of justification of punishment.”44 In arriving at this
conclusion I believe that Small is overlooking the possibility that what’s truly
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important lies behind the various meanings. That is, the single, unified principle
from which all meaning is evaluated is power.
Words, as Nietzsche put it, are pockets “into which now this, now
that, now several things at once have been put!”45 And just as words, things, and
customs are constructions of power by now this and now that force, in Nietzsche
we are confronted with a thinker who wants “to look now out this window, now
out that.”46

Whatever meaning or purpose happens to be associated with

punishment is not, for Nietzsche, the central question. The central question is
whether this meaning is of noble or corrupt origins.
Purposes and utilities are only signs that a will to power has
become master of something less powerful and imposed upon it the
character of a function; and the entire history of a “thing," an organ,
a custom can in this way be a continuous sign-chain of ever new
interpretations and adaptations whose causes do not even have to
be related to one another but, on the contrary, in some cases
succeed and alternate with one another in a purely chance fashion.
The “evolution” of a thing, a custom, an organ is thus by no means
it progressus toward a goal, even less a logical progressus by the
shortest route and with the smallest expenditure of force—but a
succession of more or less profound, more or less mutually
independent processes of subduing, plus the resistances they
encounter, the attempts at transformation for the purpose of
defense and reaction, and the results of successful counteractions.
The form is fluid, but the “meaning” even more so...even a partial
diminution of utility, an atrophying and degeneration, a loss of
meaning and purposiveness—in short, death— is among the
conditions of an actual progressus, which always appears in the
shape of a will and way to greater power and is always carried
through at the expense of numerous smaller powers...in all events
a will to power is operating 47
The remainder of this section is broken into three parts dedicated to
drawing out the idea of investigating behind punishment’s meaning and
evaluating it as either an exercise of noble or corrupt origins. In the first section I
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establish the delicate relationship between punishment’s noble and corrupt
practice.

In the second section I use this basic distinction to build a more

comprehensive account of the noble practice of punishment, focusing attention
on how meaning fluctuates as social Power increases.

Finally, in the third

section I carefully examine Nietzsche’s criticism of punishment as a form of
corruption from three distinct perspectives.

The first involves an account of

ressentiment and punishments moral-religious implications.

The second

discusses Nietzsche’s criticism of utilitarian justifications of punishment.

I

conclude with a discussion Nietzsche’s opposition to punishment as unadorned
revenge.

Noble & Corrupt
What is the most basic condition upon which social interaction is possible?
Nietzsche’s answer is the ability to make and keep promises. Without the ability
to control our immediate impulses and interests, social arrangements and
personal agreements would have collapsed the moment they were entered, thus
making disadvantageous human association for anybody but the weak.

The

beginnings of social interaction, however, are not dictated by the weaker over the
stronger. Furthermore, Nietzsche makes clear that without social frameworks,
the highest type of power, the overman, is not possible. The establishment of a
social framework, therefore, can be considered an act of creation, the
overcoming of a will to power, through which the generation of greater power
becomes possible, and it all begins with the human capacity to promise.
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The human animal, once controlled entirely by impulsive drives and a
regulating unconscious, as all other animals under the spell of nature are, and
restricted by an “active and in the strictest sense positive faculty of repression”
which preserves the health and vitality of the organism through the force of
forgetfulness (forgetfulness, not memory, is normal and necessary), does not
have a natural capacity to make promises.48 So how did social arrangements
become possible? How did the human animal break from nature’s thrall and
internalize social regulation?

This break, according to Nietzsche, was

accomplished by the formation of permanent memory through which the normal
force of forgetfulness could, in certain cases, be canceled, and the impulsive
connection with nature then overridden. Only by breeding a memory to counter
act the more natural course of human behavior is self-regulated action possible.
To that end, punishment served an essential function as a form-giving force in
this preparatory task that man performed “upon himself during the greater part of
existence of the human race.”49
How is a memory created in humans to any greater degree than the basic
kind of biological memory we might expect in animals, like a memory to avoid
fire, or large falls, or stronger animals? Let’s start by looking at contemporary
evidence.

How are many dogs trained to stay in the yard when immediate

restrictions like owners and leashes are taken away? One common method is
the electrical fence, a device which operates, in essentials, by habitually
associating painful memories with a dog’s “social” boundaries. According to
Nietzsche, the human animal, as well, was formed at its most basic level through
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pain, the result of a sublimated “instinct that realized that pain is the most
powerful aid to mnemonics.”50 Only when something is burned into the mind
through a painful association, one which isn’t simply washed away by the force of
forgetfulness, is memory first created, and only when such memories are
manufactured to override impulses is nature broken. Thus promises attending
primitive social agreements were first upheld through the active creation of
memory, a task made possible by sublimating the most excruciating experiences
of pain and cruelty in the form of punishment and executed for the purpose of
creating certain indispensable memories necessary for social regulation.
What is behind the purpose of creating these initial indispensable
memories? What explains this need? Power. The basis of all human interaction
begins with power measuring itself against another power and from this
evaluation arriving at agreements guided by the interests of power. As such,
“setting prices, determining values, contriving equivalences, exchanging—these
preoccupied the earliest thinking of man to so great an extent that in a certain
sense they constitute thinking as such.”51 Here “promises were made,” and it is
thus here “that a memory had to be made for those who promised.”52
Punishment, in this situation, is a sublimation of nature’s harsh cruelty for the
purpose of upholding obligations and promises.
The worse man’s memory has been, the more fearful has been the
appearance of his customs; the severity of the penal code provides
an especially significant measure of the degree of effort needed to
overcome forgetfulness and to impose a few primitive demands of
social existence as present realities upon these slaves of
momentary affect and desire.53
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Those without memory, without the capacity to self-regulate, are slaves
insofar as weakness describes a will which is the spastic will of competing
impulsive drives.

Here the purpose associated with punishment is to expand

Power beyond this level; and as this Power increases the value of punishment is
altered.
The “creditor” always becomes more humane to the extent that he
has grown richer; finally, how much injury he can endure without
suffering from it becomes the actual measure of his wealth...the
health of a society...how many parasites it can stand.54
On one rung of the ladder punishment has value, but the value of this
value is only valuable insofar as it enables a power to overcome this stage of
development and climb to a higher rung, upon which it can be said that this
previous value was a means to its own devaluation. In other words, as power
increases the tendency to punish decreases, though punishment is itself
necessary for power’s increase.
It is this precise process of overcoming that I shall argue is characteristic
of the positive value associations Nietzsche dichotomizes the history of
punishment through, and which therefore distinguish it from another, dark history
through which weak, corrupt motivations dominate. True, in the service of power
punishment was once practiced to create conditions in which promises could be
made, and thus it is also true that without punishment inevitable disadvantage
and instability would have precluded qualitative developments in social relations.
However, Nietzsche makes a seamless transition from this application of
punishment to one which, upon first appearance is similar enough to be
overlooked, though upon closer examination has a completely distinct meaning:
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punishment executed as a form of compensation. The notion of justice which
balances injury with the infliction of pain is, to modem ears, almost axiomatic.
We are captivated (literally) by “Law and Order.” Nietzsche, however, links these
scales of justice back to the practice of punishment which originated for the
purpose of compensation, and ultimately chastises it as the creation of the weak.
Punishment as compensation? as way of balancing scales? But how can
punishment undo a deed? While Nietzsche appears to intentionally blur some
initial details, he explicitly suggests that this idea originated because certain
creditors were, above all other considerations, seduced by the sheer pleasure of
being able to inflict pain and suffering upon debtors. In exchange for the injury of
losing some actual material possession, the creditor accepted as compensation
the “pleasure of being allowed to vent his power freely upon one who is
powerless...the enjoyment of violation.”55

Indeed, cruelty is, according to

Nietzsche, a deep source of pleasure for human beings: “To see others suffer
does one good, to make others suffer even more.”56 No longer in the wild where
humans once freely vented desires, social animals are forced to create different
channels and outlets through which cruel instincts can be humored, thus
explaining ancient festivals involving public torture and execution and right
through modernity’s more “humane” celebration of cruelty on talk shows hosted
by ring leaders like Jerry Springer.

And so too in punishment, Nietzsche

proclaims, “there is so much that is festive!”67
Yet Nietzsche is by no means glorifying such an end, be it for the pleasure
of the executor or the audience. In fact, he links these origins to weakness: the
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compensation of a will to power that reacts to the frustration of some perception
of impotence by seeking out victims it can rise above. The more enjoyment one
finds in suffering, the lower this person’s power and social standing, for it is of the
essence of weakness to seek pseudo feelings of power by looking down on the
helpless, suffering, powerless.

So, too, when punishment is sought as

compensation for an injury, and is no longer a genuinely creative activity as I
argue it is in other cases, is the practice a reflection of weakness. To what extent
is the history of punishment implicated? To the extent that from very early on
legal evaluations were created between the creditor’s injury and the amount of
pain to be inflicted upon the debtor.

Here material compensation is ignored.

Instead the creditor punishes for the pleasure of participating “in a right of the
masters...the exalted sensation of being allowed to despise and mistreat
someone as ‘beneath him’...The compensation...consists in a warrant for and
title to cruelty.”58 Hence Nietzsche locates, although confusingly if not seen in this
context, a counter movement to this practice among the noble.
I consider it an advance, as evidence of a freer, more generous,
more Roman conception of law when the Twelve Tables of Rome
decreed it a matter of indifference how much or how little the
creditor cut off in such cases.59
Using this framework to distinguish between noble and corrupt, Nietzsche
expands his discussion to larger contexts.
Noble
Social development tends to progress in the same direction it originated.
The normative element of power behind the value measurements and
subsequent ways of interacting established during initial creditor/debtor relations
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is again and again transferred into all higher arrangements of social
development.60 With power as the primary and ever evolving end, justice, was,
at its inception, “the good will among parties of approximately equal power to
come to terms with one another, to reach an ‘understanding’ by means of a
settlement—and to compel parties of lesser power to reach a settlement among
themselves.-”61 As power increases so will the concept of justice change. In a
truly powerful state, after a long battle of overcoming, the same justice which
maintained delicate social connections with not so delicate measures, exhibits
the refined and rare privilege of mercy.
Nietzsche illuminates this idea in the description of a healthy community’s
overcoming. The community, a tremendous advantage for human prosperity,
one which Nietzsche is critical of thinkers like Rousseau for dismissing, serves to
protect those under it from the outside world of violence.62 In power terms, the
community is similar to the creditor in that it provides for those it protects, the
debtors, power in the form of shelter and protection from an otherwise hostile
environment.

The community's power, and subsequent ability to survive, is,

however, the reflection of a collective idea shared by its debtors, an idea which is
therefore initially weak (otherwise why would there be a need for the community)
and in potential danger of collapse. When the community is young and its power
not yet stabilized, it treats members who break the law as it does any external
threat leveled at the whole. “The lawbreaker,” writes Nietzsche, “...has actually
attacked his creditor,” and his punishment, because he threatens the survival of
the community, consists in being thrust back into the violent wild as a symbolic
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reminder of just why the community is so important in the first place.63 Initially,
punishment is practiced as a way of stabilizing the power of the community (the
/

direct object of damage is no concern), and it is for this reason that, as we
previously discussed, the forms of punishment have historically been linked with
war practices.

As the community establishes a stable power, however, the

meaning of punishment undergoes a major change and is directed toward
different purposes: higher purposes, to be more precise.

Punishment now

assumes the purpose of minimizing the damage which occurs in response to the
crime after the crime. To this end punishment serves, among other functions, as
a “compromise” with the injured party’s desire for revenge, as a way of
“localizing” the transgression and preventing its spread, or in order to determine
compensation and “settle” the matter completely.64 What’s crucial is that the
associated meaning is altering with the changing power:
As the power and self-confidence of a community increase, the
penal law always becomes more moderate; every weakening or
imperiling of the former brings with it a restoration of the harsher
forms of the latter.65
Under the auspices of strength, the practice of punishment, its value,
alters—and thus contributes to the altering—in the fluctuating context of power.
Law, punishment, and justice, all of which originate in the sphere of the “active,
strong, spontaneous, aggressive,” are practices through which now this
application, now that application, serve to generate greater units of power. The
meaning associated with punishment was never and is never the controlling end.
In fact, the most common target of these associations, destruction, exploitation,
injury, violence, are at bottom essential, and in the strictest sense, vital functions
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of life; opposing conceptions of justice were actively created-thus not as
responses to violence predicated on notions of higher law—in order to channel
these essential processes, to control, direct, sublimate them toward higher ends,
but not eliminate them altogether. As such, Nietzsche considers a practice like
punishment an “exceptional condition, ” since its inherent function is to restrict the
“will of life,” though when instrumentally deployed in broader developmental
context it is “subordinate to its total goal as a single means: namely, as a means
of creating greater units of power.”66 In the process of overcoming, punishment is
once again necessary and valuable in certain stages of power development.
Increasing power correlates with an increasing degree of tolerance and
humaneness.

Just as Nietzsche proposes that we measure the wealth of a

person by the amount of financial injury they can incur without suffering, so too
does he propose that we measure the power of a society by the amount of harm
it can withstand without feeling threatened. In a weak society dissent is treated
as parasitic, but in a powerful and healthy society such parasites are not only
tolerated, they’re accommodated.
It is not unthinkable that a society might attain such a
consciousness of power that it could allow itself the noblest luxury
possible to it—letting those who harm it go unpunished.67
The same justice which once sought to control behavior, compel
conformity, and enforce terms “ends by winking and letting those incapable of
discharging their debts go free: it end, as does every good thing on earth, by
overcoming itself.^ Empowerment, not moral or utilitarian concerns, is the end
to which all justice strives. Ultimate power points beyond punishment: “This self
overcoming of justice: one knows the beautiful name it has given itself—mercy; it
29
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goes without saying that mercy remains the privilege of the most powerful man,
or better, his—beyond the law.”69 What Nietzsche envisions for a new concept of
punishment, one that comes to replace the old one once society is strong enough
for it, is later developed in the final section.
Corruption
Ressentiment & Morality. “I don’t like him.”—Why?—“I am not equal to
him.”—Has any human being ever answered that way?70 I briefly sketched
Nietzsche’s positive conception of justice in the sphere of nobility above. In this
sphere the practice of punishment, I argued, is subservient to the goal of creating
greater units of power, and thus must fluctuate accordingly.

According to

Nietzsche, however, the modem idea of justice is grounded in the response to
moral wrongdoing. Just as we commonly associate guilt with the experience of
suffering, moral appeals to retribution construct notions of justice out of penal
responses to violations of the moral law. Punishment is held to be an end in
itself, and suffering the source of atonement. It’s no secret that Nietzsche rejects
all theological assumptions and practices, but in rejecting these prejudices some
natural explanation for their existence must be offered, for something about
God’s existence exists when billions of people worship: Nietzsche must provide a
natural explanation for why it is that we’ve come to so readily associate
punishment with so many aspects of life. Why do we see punishment as the
proper moral response to wrongdoing? No other animals punish. Why do many
people interpret life as a form of punishment through which atonement for
irremovable imperfection is possible? Why has the predominant world belief
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been that in death one is either eternally punished or rewarded?

Nietzsche

explains these connections as historical developments that evolved through a
basic psychological reaction to suffering called ressentiment.
Ressentiment describes a psychological state of mind which Nietzsche
attributes to the corruption and revaluation of the noble values “good” and “bad”
into “good” and “evil”. Under ressentiment the purpose of punishment is radically
transformed into an instrument of violence to achieve the “submerged hatred, the
vengefulness of the impotent.”71
Ressentiment, according to Nietzsche, is behavior that is fundamentally
the reactive response to some perceived feeling of suffering, and its aim, not to
be confused for a means of preventing further harm, is to relieve or “deaden pain
by means of affects.”72 Its object, whoever the victim happens to be, is thus not
causal. Ressentiment is therefore action that can be reduced to reaction: “No is
its creative deed.”73 Lack of power underlies ressentiment, its increase is never a
consequence.

All ressentiment which cannot be discharged and overcome,

spreads like a poisonous cancer through the body. Best thing: to be above all
feelings of ressentiment. Second best thing: to discharge any feelings through
an immediate, honest response. That humans, as animals trapped within the
repressive structures of society, develop feelings of ressentiment from time to
time is not the major target of Nietzsche’s concern.

That these feelings of

ressentiment can grow to such proportions that entire lives, entire epochs of
history, entire systems of values are created as a result is.
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The expansion of ressentiment into a creative force is explained by
Nietzsche in the story of the historical battle for power between two ruling
classes: Rome’s warrior nobility and the physically weaker Jewish Priesthood, a
battle which left the Priests defeated and thus without recourse to the real
physical revenge of “true reaction, that of deeds."74 With their will to power still
intact, suffering deeply from disempowerment, overrun with the desire for
vengeance but prevented from acting, obsessed with the fate of their evil enemy,
the repressed hatred, the overwhelming, natural, instinctive desire to overcome
these Roman conquerors and exact suffering, grew and grew, until finally the
Priests compensated for physical impotence by devising a clever form of
revenge: a replication of the conditions of revenge through a radical revaluation
of the noble values of “good” and “bad".

In short, a slave rebellion against

master morality to convince the world that, in their state of repression, the slaves
were the happy ones and the masters were the ones who suffered.
How do the slaves revolt?

“The slave revolt in morality begins when

ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values.”75 Unable to
retaliate physically and satisfy the root of their anguish, the Priests label the
Roman’s an evil enemy and target the very values upon which the conditions of
their oppression and suffering exist.

The noble values, a creative act first

involving the correlation of power with “good” and then, only afterwards, the
inversion with “bad,” is exploited by the priests who arrive at a new concept of
“good” through the inversion of the concept “evil” that they created in the act of
saying no to Roman strength and hostility. Nietzsche sees this as the beginning
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of a revaluation of values because, in essence, that associated with the original,
noble “good” is now called “evil” and that with the original, noble “bad” now, out of
the habit of opposites, assumes the station of “good.”

But the feelings

associated with “good” (happiness, fortune, Power, etc) and “bad” (misery,
misfortune, suffering) don’t just follow with this inversion, and what the priests
want is revenge against the Romans and thus for the Romans to experience the
misery associated with bad and to perceive of the Priests as the blessed and
fortunate good.76 To this end they must alter the conditions upon which the very
psychological associations of “happiness” and “unhappiness” rest, and here
punishment takes on a radically different purpose.
How can naturally occurring emotions be psychologically re
associated with other naturally occurring emotions so that under the objective
conditions which first gave birth to each emotion a different emotion eventually
comes to be the one psychologically activated? The answer is by no means
simple, although it has, according to Nietzsche, occurred. While abbreviated,
below I’ll examine two important ideas associated with this transformation which
are intimate to the practice of punishment.
First, free will, the belief that there is a responsible agent behind action, a
subject, a soul, must evolve to such an extent that the Priests and all who they
value as “good” (the weak, powerless, etc.) can rationalize their inaction and
social standing as somehow a choice that they actively make, one that they could
choose not to be making, in common language a “moral” decision.77 This same
notion of choice must also be used to develop the belief that strength can
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somehow not be expressed through acts of strength and overcoming to so great
an extent that the weak may in turn hold “morally” responsible the strong and
powerful for acting with strength and power “thus they gain the right to make the
bird of prey accountable for being a bird of prey.”78 Doing so, however, involved
an extreme act of self-deception on the part of its inventors; what the priests aim
to attack is not strength, power, and vitality itself, but their own “irremovable
reality,” which is to say their inability to overcome some greater strength, power,
and vitality, and thus, for the sake of their threatened strength, power, and
vitality, their need to sanctify this original lie. “Verily,” chuckles Zarathustra, “I
have often laughed at the weaklings who thought themselves good because they
had no claws.”79
Second, the attending notions of pleasure, happiness, power,
originally connected with the noble “good”, must be attached to the new value of
“good” (which again is being weak, powerless, unhappy, etc.) while the attending
notions of suffering, revenge, unhappiness, originally connected with the noble
“bad,” must be attached to the new value of “evil” (which again is strength,
power, happiness, etc.) Here the concept of punishment, in conjunction with
reward, becomes problematic in a whole new way and to a much more significant
degree in almost all facets of social activity. The Priests target those they are still
capable of exerting power over: the suffering, unhappy masses (the noble
conception of bad). Christ’s sacrifice is intellectualized to reinterpret the mass’s
experience of suffering as a duty to God, and thus as a means to bliss: “It was
suffering and incapacity that created all afterworld.”80 Individuals are to choose
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between “good” or “evil” as they do between eternal reward in Heaven, or eternal
punishment in Hell. The absurdities of the revaluation’s possibility are no longer
as apparent as Nietzsche explains how previous mental associations between
suffering and pleasure (like pleasure in causing others to suffer) are exploited
and re-associated by those who suffer of themselves and now derive pleasure in
this suffering with the thought that it will one day pay off in their redemption.81
Thus the priests found a way to exact ultimate revenge on the noble by
revaluating the values of “good” and “bad” into “good” and “evil”. The “good” who
are now “evil” and the “bad” who are now “good” shall one day be reconciled by
God’s eternal command: “The blessed in the kingdom of heaven will see the
punishments of the damned, in order that their bliss be more delightful for
them.”82 Thus Nietzsche accuses Christianity’s revaluation of noble values of
insidiously exploiting punishment into the most fundamental ideas of existence:
life as a form of punishment and guilt and an afterlife or eternal punishment for
those not reconciled on earth.
Nietzsche also claims that this phenomenon has created the basis of our
secular forms of justice. Why do we automatically associate punishment as the
proper response to wrongdoing? Where did the concept of moral guilt with the
back and forth connection between the suffering experienced through
punishment and the redemption for wrongdoing originate?

According to

Nietzsche: from the material conditions that began in the creditor/debtor
relationship and were then exploited by ressentiment.

Nietzsche traces the

etymological history of our moral concept guilt “Schuld” and links it with the
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primitive material concept debts “Schulden.”83 In primitive times punishment was
not, as it is today, a moral decision “imposed because one held the wrongdoer
responsible for the deed.”84 For the ancients such cruelty was an “enchantment
of the first order, a genuine seduction to life,” though today we have the tendency
to deny away any interest in seeing others suffer even as we cause them to.85
This is symptomatic of ressentiment because moral justifications are invoked in
order to act upon deeply repressed desires to vent revenge and hatred on others.
In moral individuals the strongest desires to hurt and rule are often concealed:
“when they call themselves the good and the just, do not forget that they would
be Pharisees, if only they had—power.”86 Thus we have our revenge which calls
itself punishment: “it feigns a good conscience for itself with a lie."87 Thus
Zarathustra counsels us to “Mistrust all in whom the impulse to punish is
powerful,” and who “talk much of their justice,” for in the background lurks the
secret ambitions of a tyrant.88
With the advance of Christianity, these new conceptions of justice and
guilt are increasingly secularized and come to displace the more basic, noble
practices of justice. “Whatever exists,” writes Nietzsche, “having somehow come
into being, is again and again reinterpreted to new ends.”89 One such example is
illustrated through Nietzsche’s accusation that Duhring, a German philosopher
and rabid anti-Semite, writes to “sanctify revenge under the name of justice—as
if justice were at bottom merely a further development of the feeling of being
aggrieved.”90 The social institution of justice, which previously came to be as a
means to ending the “senseless raging of ressentiment among the weaker
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powers,”91 is exploited and transformed by the ambitions of ressentiment, and
Nietzsche sees this clearly in the penal institutions of the late 19th century.
Predictably, his response is to attack the spirit of his age:
At present, to be sure, he who has been injured, irrespective of how
this injury is to be made good, will still desire his revenge and will
turn for it to the courts—and for the time being the courts continue
to maintain our detestable criminal codes, with their shopkeeper’s
scales and the desire to counterbalance guilt with punishment: but
can we not get beyond this?...Let us do away with the concept
sin—and let us quickly send after it the concept punishment! May
these banished monsters henceforth live somewhere other than
among men, if they want to go on living at all and do not perish of
disgust with themselves!92
Utilitarianism. Nietzsche is explicitly critical of utilitarianism, particularly as
a theory which stresses the welfare of the masses at the expense of the
individual. “The magnitude of an “advance” can even be measured,” Nietzsche
claims, “by the mass of things that had to be sacrificed to it; mankind in the mass
sacrificed to the prosperity of a single stronger species of man—that would be
an advance.93
Punishment as an instrument of the utilitarian moral objective to maximize
overall pleasure and eliminate pain, fear, and conflict is attacked by Nietzsche for
being a weapon used by the weak to propagate over the strong.

Such

punishment originates in a community’s reactive instinct for self-preservation, not
in the active instinct for power.

A community which develops out of fear of

hostile, aggressive powers, combats these feelings of danger in a series of steps
which begin by directing their own powerful individuals against outside sources of
fear. For a time being, two sources of fear are neutralized as the dangerous
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individuals within the community are exploited and directed against all outside
threats, though once the “structure of society is fixed on the whole and seems
secure against external dangers,” the community turns its attention and fight
against the nobility.94 Fear is driven inward as the community feels threatened
by “everything that elevates an individual above the herd and intimidates the
neighborhood.”95 The herd instinct is to transform the war machine into a
punishment machine to eliminate inner danger.

Punishment within such a

community serves to infinitely expand upon values of zero; what the community
“overcomes” is everything fearful, great, dangerous and powerful within human
beings.

In short, everything Nietzsche believes is of value.

Thus, what is

honored as moral and virtuous by the herd is “mediocrity of desires,” until
eventually the community becomes so peaceful and gentle that “every severity,
even in justice begins to disturb the conscience.”96 Out of fear the community
adapts to the point where it has effectively suppressed all active sources of
power, even its own, and eventually “imagining ‘punishment’ and ‘being
supposed to punish’ hurts it, arouses fear in it. It sides with the criminal: ‘Is it not
enough to render him undangerous? Why still punish?

Punishing itself is

terrible.’”97 Not out of strength is punishment overcome, but weakness. What
does such progress want: “that some day there should be nothing more to be
afraid o/!”98 That is nihilism.

This, Nietzsche claims, is the outcome of

utilitarianism.
Revenge. “For that man be delivered from revenge, that is for me the
bridge to the highest hope, and a rainbow after long storms.”99 What would be
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wrong with punishing in order to exact revenge? Doesn’t Nietzsche’s denial of
morality leave open this possibility? We can certainly imagine a practice of
punishment that isn’t entrenched in ressentiment’s deceptive, cunning soup of
emotions, or utilitarianism’s timid, pleasure calculus.

What about the more

explicit, baggage free act of revenge that makes no reference to ‘‘morals’’ or
‘‘justice” or “utility”? Freud said that his idea of heaven was to sip lemonade on
his porch and watch his five most hated enemies hang from a tree in his
backyard. Homer called it “sweeter than honey.” I like it. Even Nietzsche seems
to glorify revenge on occasion as an essential and honorable practice of the
noble: “...that enthusiastic impulsiveness in...revenge by which all noble souls
have at all times recognized one another.”100 Revenge was, after all, one of the
strongest customs of the powerful for a long time.

Shouldn’t we still seek

revenge on the monsters that violate our children, murder our loved ones,
mercilessly assault the weak, and senseless destroy what is most cherished!
While it may be tempting to consider Nietzsche’ lack of moral focus an
opportunity to trap his philosophy into a position that cannot challenge revenge,
Nietzsche is vehemently opposed to revenge and his commitments to power
allow him this position. Of course with Nietzsche nothing is black and white, and
revenge is seen, as I will show, at times, to be a healthier response than
remaining silent. In the end, however, it is essential for a strong society and the
true “overman” to overcome any biological connections it has with revenge and
the connections to punishment.
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Nietzsche’s vision of redemption is, in many ways, the opposite of that
instinctual desire in revenge to seek out and destroy the cause of suffering. Our
will, its ability to create the future and determine circumstances, is, for Nietzsche,
the one and only form of liberation. Through revenge, the will seeks liberation
from suffering through the redemption of a past event, an “it was," a fate that it
would not will and thus wants to unwill. But the will is powerless against the past
and cannot will back in time, thus it suffers and seeks to make suffer. “This,"
writes Nietzsche, “is what revenge is: the will’s ill will against time and its ‘it
was.’”101 Where there is revenge and suffering and desire for redemption, here
too one finds punishment, but revenge and punishment only further strengthen
the prison in which the will rebels against, for fighting the past as something that
must be “undone” perpetuates the will’s powerlessness to undo. “No deed can
be annihilated,” writes Nietzsche, “how could it be undone by punishment?”102
What Nietzsche offers in place of the futile attempt to redeem the past
through revenge is a conception of redemption based on affirmation. “To redeem
those who lived in the past and to recreate all ‘it was’ into a ‘thus I willed if—that
alone should I call redemption.” Only in the future can we, at every moment, be
liberated by our will and its ability to create circumstances. In the future alone,
therefore, we redeem the past by realizing the future through it. As painful and
awful as a situation might be, our only redemption from it lies in eternal
affirmation: moving forward with the understanding that it had to happen that
way, you willed it to happen that way, you continue to will it that way and prove it
eternally benefits you. Thus, when Zarathustra is bitten by the Adder he does
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not, as the Adder anticipates, retaliate with punishment, but rather finds in the
experience the benefit of being reminded to continue his journey, and rebuts any
insinuation that something less powerful than he could cause in him ill will.103
Justice is not presented as a cold, unassailable retaliation without which
redemption is impossible, but rather a positive, and in the strictest sense forwardlooking disposition which develops in oneself through the process of overcoming.
Revenge, however, isn’t always a backward-looking activity, as is the case
for the justice in individuals who are not rich and powerful enough to fully
renounce revenge. Zarathustra councils those who would be put to shame by
another’s actions to instead be angry and “join a little in the cursing.”104 Why?
Because a “little revenge” can be the best medicine for someone to shake out of
their system what would otherwise eat them away. But this is a real tempered
endorsement of revenge, and it certainly isn’t meant to be realized in any social
practice of punishment. If society is to respond to a crime of some sort with
punishment, the only justifiable purpose would be to do so in order to minimize
any ensuing private revenge, certainly not promote it.

Meanwhile, in the

strongest, not only has revenge and punishment been overcome, but a new level
of justice is attained.

The most powerful are not only capable of declaring

themselves wrong, but of doing so even when they are right, and thus bearing
“not only all punishment but also all guilt.”105 This, according to Nietzsche, would
truly be divine.
Absence of any outward desire for revenge, the personal restraint,
emotional control, and calmness toward those assaulting us is, Nietzsche claims,
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“a piece of perfection and supreme mastery on earth.”106 If we knew our
attacker’s every circumstance, the social forces that have shaped them, the
personal weaknesses that drive their insecurities, the lack of perspective in their
decision making, in short all the factors contributing to their behavior, and then
coupled these with our own overflowing sense of personal Power and
achievement, then our sense of justice is most complete.

Christ’s most

venerable achievement was, in Nietzsche’s eyes, the freedom he experienced
from all feelings of ressentiment and anger as he was crucified.
Tell me, where is that justice which is love with open eyes?...Would
that you might invent for me the justice that acquits everyone,
except him that judges!107
How does Zarathustra suggest we can be just and give to each their own? “Let
this be sufficient for me: I give each my own.”
Such perfection, however, is rare in individuals, and to most a personal
affront quickly causes the blood to boil and disrupts any sense of fairness. An
individual’s psychological state of mind must be brought into question to
determine whether power or weakness is generated in their response.

Here

restraint is not perfection, though perhaps it’s impotence and cowardice dressed
in all too familiar phrases like “being the bigger man” and turning the other cheek.
While delivering us from revenge and punishment may be Nietzsche’s highest
hope, encouraging these behaviors when one is either not strong enough to act
in such a way or when lack of response is the result of taming and weakening is
not. Ultimate self-perfection does consist in perfect self-control and the mercy of
a large soul, but the mere absence of retaliation, a calm approach, restraint from
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wanting to hurt, understanding, consideration, politeness, and every other
disposition which distinguishes the ancient human from the modem one means
nothing if incompatible with the individual’s psychological state. “A little revenge
is more human than no revenge,” and we must therefore be careful not to
confuse cowardly inaction with that rare achievement of strength sublimated into
perfection.108 In the flux of overcoming, “good” and “bad” represent values that
evolve alongside the generation of power. A strong society mediates conflict
when the instincts for revenge cannot be controlled among individuals.
Alas, then the tarantula, my old enemy, bit me...‘Punishment there
must be and justice,’ it thinks...Indeed, it has avenged itself. And
alas, now it will make my soul, too, whirl with revenge. But to keep
me from whirling, my friends, tie me tight to this column. Rather
would I be a stylite, even, than a whirl of revenge. Verily,
Zarathustra is no cyclone or whirlwind; and if he is a dancer, he will
never dance the tarantella.109
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CHAPTER V

FROM A POSSIBLE FUTURE

Nietzsche’s criticism of punishment is the initial step in the act of creation;
he envisions its return to nobility.

The final section of this essay will be an

attempt to develop a heuristic outline for what a noble practice of punishment
which empowers power might look like today.
Let’s begin by recapitulating Nietzsche’s thoughts on punishment in the
sphere of nobility. Power represents ultimate value, and such value is attainable
through great individuals.

Attainment of the highest individual type is only

possible under social arrangements. Social power is therefore conceptualized in
terms of accommodating the highest forms of individual achievement: “The goal
of humanity cannot lie in the end but only in its highest specimens.”110 Penal laws
develop with “an eye only for the degenerating.”111 Punishment is a sublimation
of violent force with the goal of promoting favorable social conditions for the
noble order; the role of punishment must fluctuate with every change in power.
Observing this fluctuation is essential, for, paradoxically, the greatest danger to
noble development is also the establishment of authority. A social arrangement’s
survival depends first on the overall stabilization of “force through the union of
minds.”112 Its continuation, however, demands steady social progression through
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the incorporation of new “types” into the norm, a process attained “through the
occurrence of degenerate natures and, as a consequence of them, partial
weakenings and injurings of the stabilizing force.”113 The same stability under
which ennoblement is possible can become the “dangerous companion” which
ultimately resists it, in turn thwarting the development of individual greatness—
“the church sends all ‘great men’ to hell, it fights against all ‘greatness of
man.’”114 The question we are left to answer is how a noble conception of
punishment balances the need to maintain some level of social stability against
the demand that individuals be able to break with social restrictions.
Without the will to punish there is, in Nietzsche’s view, no such thing as a
criminal, for one is deemed “criminal” only in reference to the dominating social
order. Given how sensitive the relationship between the individual’s task of selfdetermination and the necessity for social structure is in Nietzsche’s thinking, the
concept of “criminal” and the value associated with punishment must be closely
scrutinized.

I thus propose differentiating the concept of “criminal” into six

categories in order to examine the value of punishment in various circumstances.
The categories I’ve created were inspired by synthesizing Nietzsche’s seemingly
disparate reflections on punishment of criminals and interpreting them through
six fundamental categories. They are as follows: (1) The weak, amoral criminal,
(2) The weak, immoral criminal, (3) The weak, moral criminal, (4) The active,
amoral criminal, (5) The active, moral criminal, and (6) The active, immoral
criminal. The terms moral, immoral, and amoral should be non-controversial, for
they correspond with assumptions basic to all moral systems: the exercise of
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self-control. Without the ability to exercise self-control one is not capable of
acting morally and thus is amoral. Since I am modifying the concept of “criminal”,
the terms “moral” and “immoral” refer specifically to the agent’s state of mind: the
capacity to make a choice was present and, in doing so, is compared with the
criminal’s personal sense of right and wrong; the immoral criminal breaks two
sets of laws while the moral criminal Only one. The terms active and weak further
classify the criminal’s action according to power.

“What is active?” asks

Nietzsche: “reaching out for power.”115
In section 740 of the “Will to Power” Nietzsche distinguishes between
criminals who are a part of the concept of "revolt against the social order'" and
what he calls "the race of criminals" ("die Rasse des Verbrechertums").116 The
classification of weak, amoral criminals is captured in Nietzsche’s idea of "the
race of criminals" conceived of in contrast with the "free spirits” discussed later.
Among these biologically classified criminals the value of punishment is based on
the perceived need to socially control certain types within a society who are
incapable of sublimating their basic animal impulses and exercising self-control.
Since value is created in individuals attaining greatness through self-overcoming,
social deviance in those incapable of acting otherwise is an expression of
irremovable reality, not social overcoming, and thus are a fair object of social
control. In fact, against such criminals, Nietzsche implores that society “wage
war against him even before he has committed any hostile act...first act as soon
as one has him in one's power: his castration."117 True, a deed cannot be
undone, but we’re capable of shaping our future.

Why, after all, should we
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respond to those predisposed to mindless violence after a loved one is
senselessly assaulted? If we truly renounce the backward motivated objective
imbedded within the practice of revenge as Nietzsche challenges us to, then it
means punishment isn’t necessarily justified on the basis of a criminal act alone,
but rather only, among other considerations, by the disposition to commit acts in
the future. Nietzsche is so serious in locating the value of punishment in forwardlooking motivations that in these cases he is willing to take this logic to the
extreme and call for punishing those who belong to the “race of criminals” before
any criminal act has even occurred.118
The weak, immoral criminal classifies the slavish predispositions in
mankind to act criminally in such a way that nothing of value could be thought to
result. Petty crimes of selfishness and greed, the tendency to hang on to library
books indefinitely, drinking and driving, littering, and a myriad of other base
behaviors constitute these types of criminal acts which most of us are indeed
likely to commit in the absence of consequences and regardless of our own
sense of right and wrong. For Nietzsche, this criminal propensity is not, however,
the selfish invariant of human nature as Bentham might argue, thought the
accompanying pangs of conscience should not be attributed to some deeply
rooted sense of moral agency as Kant might argue. Two issues must thus be
considered. The first: what drives the individual’s actions? The second: why
does the individual subjectively acknowledge their decision is wrong? Nietzsche
considers this criminal weak and immoral because their personal sense of right
and wrong is socially generated, a trait experienced in slaves as a result of
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vanity.

Their inability to refrain from such activity without social compulsion

signifies personal weakness and proof that their values are socially constructed.
As a way of controlling the masses according to basic social standards,
Nietzsche, in my opinion, would consider valuable some limited use of
punishment as a deterrent:
If punishment and reward were abolished the strongest motives for
performing certain acts and not performing certain acts would be
abolished; mankind’s utility requires their continuance...this same
utility also requires the continuation of vanity.119
The weak, moral criminal is captured in Nietzsche’s discussion of the pale
criminal. Weak and moral may, in the present context, sound like contradictory
terms, for Nietzsche frequently associates the conscious decision to break from
social norms with notions of strength and self-determination. Here Nietzsche’s
psychological mind is, perhaps, at its sharpest. The pale criminal does break
from the laws of society with a clear conscience; indeed, she is driven to criminal
action by an inner sense of right and wrong. Upon closer examination, however,
Nietzsche connects this inner sense of right and wrong to pathological weakness.
Like Dostoevsky’s Raskolnakov, two forms of madness betray the pale criminal’s
decision to murder: a madness before the crime and a madness after the crime.
Overcome by the evil of the world she lives in, the pale criminal has become sick
and now seeks “to hurt with that which hurts [her].”120 The impulse to murder and
the lust for blood are not deep animal passions stirring in this soul, but instead a
reaction to influences she could not resist: “What it suffered and coveted this
poor soul interpreted for itself.”121 Tom by the conflicting emotions which arise in
this individual when the negative experience with hatred positively incorporates
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itself into the psyche, the schema of rational thought attempts to unify her pathos
by distorting moral reflection: “don’t you want at least to commit a robbery?”122
Confronted with the image of her deed, however, the mind experiences horror,
and in doing so reveals that weakness and confusion, not strength and selfdetermination, were responsible for her ephemeral convictions.

She is once

again too weak to resist, only this time it’s the sight of her own evil act and not
the evil of others that paralyzes her thoughts and ultimately causes her
unbearable remorse. Unable to shake off the moment, she suffers indefinitely
from guilt: “A chalk streak stops a hen."123 The pale criminal bears the worst
signs of socialization, according to Nietzsche, and betrays an incurable disease
ih individuals which, in being indiscriminately vented on others, represents the
“great contempt of man.”124 The only cure is death. Punishment is here an act of
pity, a sadness in our hearts that longs for the coming of the overman.
The active, amoral criminal can be discussed in the context of Nietzsche’s
“doctrine of the derivability of all good drives from the bad.”125 Humankind’s socalled evil drives and impulses are, in Nietzsche’s view, the raw energy which, at
bottom, is the same energy responsible for everything great and magnificent we
experience in ourselves and in others.

Every noble “morality” must therefore

consist in the controlling and overcoming of these impulses through their
sublimation, but never in their castration: “one must still have chaos in oneself to
be able to give birth to a dancing star.”126

Often times criminal behavior

corresponds with intellectual immaturity, and in these individuals unsublimated
impulses find temporary expression. Greatness reveals itself in their potential
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state of sublimation, and thus Nietzsche finds in many criminals more value than
in a nation of law abiding castrates. As Kaufman explains, “there is more joy in
heaven over one repentant sinner than over ninety-nine just men—if the latter
are just only because they are too feeble ever to have sinned.”127
Conceptualizing the practice of punishment for the promotion of power
means certain criminality, though certainly not best left to go on unchecked,
ought to be rehabilitated. Again, in locating value in punishments influence over
the future, punishing in order to determine what the criminal can someday
become requires a radical reconceptualization of the form punishment takes.
Historically speaking, the act of punishing, its form, “makes men hard and
cold...it strengthens the power of resistance.”128 For the active, amoral criminal
Nietzsche proposes altering our formal methods of punishing. Why not consider
certain criminals as we do the insane?

By posing the question this way

Nietzsche is first establishing that in this certain situation the “usual mode of
moral thinking” is in fact what’s best, and that the criminal acts in the contrary to
their own best interests.129 Thus, there is essentially no difference between the
criminal and the insane. Today we criticize previous generations for punishing
the insane as they would the criminal. Could our treatment of criminals be just as
reprehensible?
Punishable, never punished—Our crime against criminals consists
in the fact that we treat them like scoundrels.130
How a society treats its criminals is a direct indication of its health, its attainment
of Power. Are we rich enough to truly renounce revenge, to no longer feel the

50

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

need to respond with violence and hatred but instead pursue with complete
honesty the best possible future with the best possible course of action?
He needs a change of air, a change of company, a temporary
absence, perhaps he needs to be alone and have a new
occupation—very well! Perhaps he himself may find it to his
advantage to live for a time in custody, so as to secure protection
against himself and against a burdensome tyrannical drive—very
well! One should place before him quite clearly the possibility and
the means of becoming cured (the extinction, transformation,
sublimation of this drive), also, if things are that bad, the
improbability of a cure; one should offer the opportunity of suicide
to the incurable criminal who has become an abomination to
himself.
One should neglect nothing in the effort to restore to the criminal
his courage and freedom of heart; one should wipe pangs of
conscience from his soul as a matter of cleanliness, and indicate to
him how he can make good the harm done perhaps only to a single
person, and more than make good, through benefits he could
bestow on others and perhaps on the whole community. In all this
one should show him the greatest consideration! And especially in
allowing him anonymity, or a new name and frequent changes of
residence, so that his reputation and his future life shall be as little
endangered as possible.131
When sublimating is not possible, Nietzsche suggests the possibility of
suicide. Whether this is a Euphemism for capital punishment or some drastic
endorsement of castration or even the belief that the criminal might himself seek
suicide is not clear. In the case of many convicted child molesters, for instance,
the possibility of changing is, no matter how hard they try, simply unrealistic,
though often times they express a desire to change. If the value of rehabilitation
is found in sublimation of the energy responsible for an act, and sublimation is
not possible, then suicide or some comparable measure of protection is valued
as an alternative. In those capable of sublimation, the practice of punishment as
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a form of rehabilitation is redemption for any past crimes, for in renouncing
revenge and seeing to it that the individual is put on the right path we infuse
value into punishing criminal acts by transforming them into the catalysts for
greatness to come.
The active, moral criminal must, I believe, be conceptualized in two
distinct ways.

The first is conceived of as a philosopher type of "free spirit"

regarded as "criminal" for breaking with laws respecting moral common sense
because, as Nietzsche puts it, she "finds something in our society against which
war ought to be waged - [s]he awakens us from slumber."132 Insofar as history
will judge, such a law-breaker is hardly a criminal at all, but rather one who
advances society as well as the individual type.

Rosa Parks is an excellent

example of when historical reflection creates reverence for civil disobedience.
There is no value in punishing this type of criminal, for her actions advance social
notions of right and wrong and open opportunities for the individual to flourish.
The second criminal type categorized as active and moral is the individual
that is often times labeled wickedly evil but remains to us hopelessly intriguing.
The Hannibal Lectar pathologies who murder with the clearest conscience and
exact premeditation act morally and powerfully as they abide by their laws. This
presents a problem for Nietzsche. Since Nietzsche adheres to no set of moral
standards beyond those self-imposed, can he endorse social regulation of such
criminals, or is this exactly the type of individual he’s glorifying and trying to
protect from punishment’s destructive influence? The answer is yes and yes.
Insofar as life is will to power, the battlefield will always be determined by will
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against will. Advocating punishment against certain strong, moral criminals and,
at the same time, maintaining the position that the value of punishing is
determined through the creation of power shifts the focus of the question of value
onto the response forced in the noble order which must overcome and destroy
such an enemy. In society the nobility are, according to Nietzsche, kept in check
by custom, acting respectful and courteous with each other. Though familiar in
many other ways, in these ways the criminal is an outsider.

Crime and

punishment are, as Durkheim also argues, valuable insofar as they motivate
society to stay strong, healthy, and powerful. They force the noble to earn and
maintain their grasp over social direction and occasionally flex their muscles.
Broadly speaking, it is not fear of man that we should desire to see
diminished; for this fear compels the strong to be strong, and
occasionally terrible—it maintains the well-constituted type of
man.133
The concept of an active, immoral criminal sounds contradictory in terms,
for how can the idea of strength and power be associated with an individual who
violates personal notions of right and wrong? Consider:
From a possible future. - Is a state of affairs unthinkable in which
the malefactor calls himself to account and publicly dictates his own
punishment, in the proud feeling that he is thus honoring the law
which he himself has made, that by punishing himself he is
exercising his power, the power of the lawgiver; he may have
committed an offence, but by voluntarily accepting punishment he
raises himself above his offence, he does not only obliterate his
offence through freeheartedness, greatness and imperturbability,
he performs a public service as well. - Such would be the criminal
of a possible future, who, to be sure, also presupposes a future
lawgiving - one founded on the idea ‘I submit only to the law which
I myself have given, in great things and in small.’ There are so
many experiments still to make! There are so many futures still to
dawn!134
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Again, an examination of such an individual’s psychological machinery is
necessary. In order for an individual to experience themselves in violation of
their own set of standards and, in doing so, be considered active, the act of
judging themselves immoral, and not the violation itself (though not without the
violation), must be the source of power. This is only possible in individuals who
create their own set of laws and also assume the role of judge and executioner,
for in their experience of immorality a sense of personal power overflows from
them. They have created and upheld their own law as noble men will. This selfautonomous individual represents the super-human Nietzsche envisions, and
they are thus the end toward which every society strives. In a society where
individuals hold themselves accountable before themselves, self-determination is
rife and punishment an exercise of the highest power attained.
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